WORM'S EYE

Muslim religious fundamentalism or intégrisme, is inextricably interwoven with an extreme political philosophy which can perhaps best be described as-

"Fascism in islamist dress", and can be referred to as "salafist" or "islamist".

Although salafists (islamists) use (or more accurately, misuse) Islamic texts and traditions, salafist movements are not simply religious sects but political movements inspired in large part by European extremist doctrines of the far right and left.

The following extract from an excellent paper is a good introduction--

Bin Laden and Islamist Terrorism
Docent, dr.scient.pol. Mehdi Mozaffari, Aarhus Universitet

In this study Islamism is defined as “an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is the restoration of the caliphate”.

It is militant in the sense that it uses all possible means, including violence and armed fighting. It is anti-progressive in the sense that it considers modernity as a plot against the integrity of Islam. Its vision is holistic and based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity (Dîn, Dunya and Dwala), that is Religion, Way of life, and State. This indivisibility is permanent and eternal. Its ultimate goal boils down to the fulfilment of this said trinity on a global scale. This goal is justified in Mohammed’s message, prophet of Islam. This definition covers all the great common traits of all Islamist movements (to differentiate it from the Islamic movements). Now that we have defined Islamism we will now search the causes of the emergence of this movement.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 resulting to the rise of the new Turkey as a secular and ‘westernized’ state was a shock to huge majority of Muslims. Confronted with the new situation, Muslims took three different and rival directions: 1) Liberal and democratic, 2) Authoritarian, and, 3) Islamists.

The Liberal trend did not succeed, partly because of hostility from some Western countries, United Kingdom in particular. The authoritarian trend reigned the longest in its diverse forms (military, traditionalist and secular). This trend still remains the dominating tendency in the Middle East.

Islamists took power in Iran in 1979 and in Afghanistan in 1996. With regard to Marxists, the fact is that they have never played an important role in this region. Marxists however came to power in Afghanistan from 1977 to 1979, followed by the Soviet invasion of the country.

This study is focused on Islamists, both as states and as movements. The Islamist trend came about in Egypt in 1928 and extended to all Muslim countries in its diverse forms and interpretations. This current always did and still seems to proliferate in essentially traditionalist urban, lower and middle class stratums. These stratums embrace a large jumble of different categories such as schoolteachers, lower civil servants, technicians, a few young priests, certain young officers, and particularly shopkeepers, merchants and tradesmen. In spite of their diversity these groups can be very easily mobilised. Mosques, numerous religious centres, societies (dawrah and halqah) serve as their favourite meeting spots.

For them, the West represents one single block without any nuances or variations whatsoever. In their reasoning, the Western political doings directed towards Muslims and other oppressed peoples are simply a direct product deriving from the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the West. In order to successfully fight against these political doings they must imperatively attack and reject the Western theoretical foundations.

Therefore, it is this closely related discourse that one finds with Hassan al-Banna, Mawdudi, Hassan al-Turabi, Ayatollah Khomeini, Osama Bin Laden, to cite only the most illustrious theoreticians and practitioners of Islamism. In this particular context, Mawdudi writes that:

“[we] aspire for Islamic renaissance on the basis of the Qu’ran. To us the Qur’anic spirit and Islamic tenets are immutable; but the application of this spirit in the realm of practical life must always vary with the change of conditions, increase of knowledge…We have to arrange these ideas and laws of life on genuine Islamic cross lines so that Islam once again becomes a dynamic force; the leader of the world rather than its follower”.

It is in the same spirit, but in more virulent terms that Ayatollah Khomeini already in the first years of his government declared:

“Muslims the world over who believe in the truth of Islam, arise and gather beneath the banner of twhid (divine unity) and the teachings of Islam! Repel the treacherous superpowers from your countries and your abundant resources. Restore the glory of Islam, and abandon your selfish disputes and differences, for you possess everything! Rely on the culture of Islam, resist Western imitation, and stand on your own feet”.

The true sense of this discourse becomes clearer if one takes a retrospective look at the temporal context in which the first Islamist discourse was pronounced. As we indicated above the formulation of such a discourse dates back to 1928. This date is very significant, four years after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the restoration of a secular Turkey. At this particular time the fall came across to the Muslim Sunnites as a terrible shock. The latter feared that this event could put an end to Islam as a complete religion.

This would inescapably bring the Muslims to abandon the sacrosanct norms of Islam and adopt European norms. It is particularly because of this reflex of loss of identity and fear of total and permanent submission to the West that the most faithful groups to a traditional Islam came into the scene organising themselves under the banners of Islam.

The Muslim Brothers organisation (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) founded in Ismailliya in Egypt was the first and by far the most sensational reaction to this fear. Thus Islamism was born and will develop during the course of the 20th century while retaining its initial message.

Central to the political objectives of salafist movements are--- The "islamist" education of the masses by charismatic teachers and leaders;

The revolutionary building of "islamist" states - where rule would be by a theocracy--an islamist dictatorship of the proletariat;

The building the "new Califate" - a transnational theocracy; Eventual world domination by the "islamist" movements

To understand something about the salafists, it is necessary to go back in time. See also-- Islam and World System: a lecture given in Michaelmas Term, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, on 21st October, 1998 by Professor Immanuel Wallerstein, Director of the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University

Just as the Christian world started to demonise Islam from the time of the Crusades (or earlier), in the Muslim world today, the Crusaders are equally demonised in popular culture. It will be seen that terrorist leaders, such as Bin Laden, frequently use the epithet "crusader" as a term of abuse and as a term to recruit sympathisers.

Professor Bernard Lewis, the Bush Administration's guru on these matters, attaches much importance to the Crusades. In his recent pop-history- "The Crisis of Islam", Lewis points out that, for Arabs, the Crusades came to be seen as "an early prototype of the expansion of European imperialism into the Islamic world".

If the truth were known, at the time they took place, the Crusades were of peripheral importance to the Islamic world. The Mongol invasions, especially the sack of Baghdad in 1258 and successful Muslim resistance to it were more significant to Muslim rulers and people of that era. The Arab world only identified the Crusades as a single and significant enterprise after they had ended and had been largely forgotten.

The present islamist view of the Crusades actually finds its origin in the 19th Century re-evaluation of the morality of the Crusades by Western historians. These new Western re-evaluations of the Crusades spread to the Middle East through the elite (often Christian Arabs) who could read Western languages. The Crusades became a theme in Turkish political debate by the late nineteenth century, and the cynically self-interested dismemberment by Britain and France of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I fed Muslim fears of the West.

As Dr. Mozaffari points out in the extract from his paper cited above, it is hard to over-estimate the profound shock the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and more importantly, the Ottoman Caliphate had on the Sunni Muslim world.

In Andrew Mango's definitve English-language biography of Atatürk [ Atatürk, Andrew Mango, ed 1999 John Murray], he describes the three decisions of Ataturk:

(1) to set up a unified secular education system; (2) to abolish the Ministry responsible for Islamic law and religious foundations; and (3) to abolish the caliphate; as being nothing more or less than "a cultural revolution".

We agree. It was perhaps as revolutionary in religious terms as was the break with Rome under Henry VIII. Instead of the faith being allowed to exercise ultimate supremacy over the state, the earthly institutions of religion are, so to speak, nationalised and made subordinate to the state.

Liberty of belief remains. The direct dialogue between man and his Creator remains. The state may (and, we would argue, must) protect the free exercise of religious belief. But the state claims and exercises the right to set limits on what believers may and may not do in the public expression of that belief.

The establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948 encouraged further historical parallels and a formerly marginal event, the Crusades, became the symbol of Western conflict with Islam.

Thus it was in the 20th Century that the Crusades became a symbol of Western colonial political oppression and profiteering. Revolts and nationalist independence movements against colonial and neo-colonial influences started in the Muslim world around 1900 - although to be exact in some cases the revolt had never really ceased since the colonial powers invaded.

Pakistan and Bangladesh have been far less successful than Turkey as democratic states. The two states originated as the two wings of the single Muslim state created in 1947 at the partition of British India. Jinnah and his Muslim League wished Pakistan to be a Muslim state which was also a democracy. Unfortunately, Jinnah died in 1948 and his dream of a democratic Pakistan was never properly realised. The Pakistani state has tottered on from crisis to crisis and is perhaps today in its deepest crisis ever. In large part that crisis is due to salafist movements.

There were two so to speak "founding organisations" from which it can be said that the islamist terrorist organisations grew: Jamaat el Islami, and the, The Muslim Brotherhood.

One of the two, Jamaat el Islami has its origins in the Indian sub-continent.

Jamaat el Islami was founded in British India by Abul A‘la Maududi (1903-1979) and others and it continues as a powerful Transnational salafist movement now based in Pakistan but influential throughout Asia.

In its early days Madudi and the Jamaat al Islami called for Muslims to leave British India and settle in Afghanistan. They were very active in the founding and encouragement of the Pakistani Madrassas-- the cradles of the modern salafist terrorist movements - of which much more on the next page.

Most of the Arab nationalist movements in the countries colonised by the European powers: Nasserism in Egypt, the Baath in Syria and Iraq, the Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the FLN in Algeria, the PLO in Palestine were essentially secular.

They were also "socialist" in the Marxist sense of that word and in a nutshell these secular nationalist movements carried within themselves the seeds of their own destruction, because they looked for inspiration to the one party model of the fascist or socialist state and sought to transform their societies with the tools used in what the Algerian FLN used to refer to as "les pays frères socialistes" (FLN-speak for the Warsaw Pact states).

The rise of the Salafists in response to western imperialism can be traced back to The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna (1905-1949) and the similar Jamaat el Islami movement of Abu Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) in Asia. These were not secular movements. They believed that the weakness and vulnerability of the Islamic states derived from the lapse of their societies from what they thought of as original "authentic" Islam.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement was politicised in the 1930's and drew much of its ideology from Mussolini's fascists. It exists today in more or less shadowy form and under a variety of names in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle Eastern Arab States.

Over the years, battles raged between the brotherhood adherents and the one-party secular states of Nasser in Egypt and the Baath in Syria and Iraq and the Hashemites in Jordan. The battle has been particularly bitter in Egypt where hundreds have been executed and thousands jailed in an endeavour to suppress the movement.

Salafist thought is either "gradualist" or "radical". Al Banna and Mawdudi represented the gradualist approach that aims to win popular support by persuasion and filling needs unmet by the state; hence the extensive charitable efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a formula also to be found in the Hamas operation in the Gaza Strip.

However, part of the so-called "gradualist" approach has been the targeting of western consumerism and elites perceived as pro-western-- culminating in the case of Egypt in the assassination of the late great Anwar es-Sadat.

The "radical" wing of the Salafist movements follows the model of “revolution from above” articulated by Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966) who led the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and spent much of his time in jail trying to subvert the secular nationalist Egyptian governments of the time until he was executed by Nasser in 1966.

It was Qutub who advocated the creation of an islamist revolutionary elite that would impose the "Islamic" state in Egypt by the use of "every violent means necessary"-- a phrase which will be absolutely familiar to students of totalitarian movements.

The Iranian Revolution is a Shiite example of a radical salafist movement, and the insurgencies in Syria and Algeria provide Sunni examples.

The key attributes of these radical salafist movements are: the glorification of the armed struggle to establish the islamist state by force; the intention to build a modern califate for the whole world; the glorification of martyrdom as a means to that end; the belief that the struggle must be commenced by acts of terrorism; and all have their origins in the Banna, Maududi (and especially) Qutub ideology.

Al Quai'da is now the most famous example of a salafist movement, but it differs from the other radical salafist movements in a number of ways--in particular it specifically demonises the United States of America as the source of all the woes of the Arab and Muslim world.

Other salafist terrorist movements have targeted westerners in general-- for example the GIA in Algeria targeted all foreign nationals working in that country. But Al-Quai'da specifically targets Americans first.

The 9-11 Commission report says this about the ideological links between Qutub and Bin Laden (Chapter2, pp 51-2)--

Bin Ladin also relies heavily on the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb. A member of the Muslim Brotherhood 11 executed in 1966 on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, Qutb mixed Islamic scholarship with a very superficial acquaintance with Western history and thought.

Sent by the Egyptian government to study in the United States in the late 1940s, Qutb returned with an enormous loathing of Western society and history. He dismissed Western achievements as entirely material, arguing that Western society possesses “nothing that will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence.”

Three basic themes emerge from Qutb’s writings. First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he called jahiliyya, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the revelations given to the Prophet Mohammed).

Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and jahiliyya. Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam.

Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight. Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of destruction.

Bin Ladin shares Qutb’s stark view, permitting him and his followers to rationalize even unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled faith. Many Americans have wondered, “Why do ‘they’ hate us?” Some also ask, “What can we do to stop these attacks?” Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have given answers to both these questions.

To the first, they say that America had attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in its southern islands. America is also held responsible for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al Qaeda as “your agents.” Bin Ladin has stated flatly, “Our fight against these governments is not separate from our fight against you.” These charges found a ready audience among millions of Arabs and Muslims angry at the United States because of issues ranging from Iraq to Palestine to America’s support for their countries’ repressive rulers.

Bin Ladin’s grievance with the United States may have started in reaction to specific U.S. policies but it quickly became far deeper.

To the second question, what America could do, al Qaeda’s answer was that America should abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality and godlessness of its society and culture: “It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind.” If the United States did not comply, it would be at war with the Islamic nation, a nation that al Qaeda’s leaders said “desires death more than you desire life.”

In common with other radical salafist terrorists, Al Quai'da targets civilians as well as military and government targets with equal venom. This is not new.

The Algerian GIA targeted priests and nuns as well as foreign seamen on cargo ships. But Al Quai'da sought the "grand symbolic gesture". The attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and on Washington DC on 11th September 2001 were the apotheosis of that policy.

The Egyptian & Sudanese Groups The principal active Egyptian Salafist groups grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood (see above) which itelf is still in existence and conducts charitable works and preaching among the poor and operates a number of political parties on a more or less legal basis. The two largest Salafist terrorist groups are Jamaat al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad both of which have been active since the 1970s.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya is Egypt’s largest Salafist militant organization.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya has a presence both in Egypt and worldwide. Its spiritual leader, the blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, is serving a life sentence in the United States for his involvement in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya conducted a violent campaign of attacks against governmental, Christian, and other targets in Egypt with the aim of overthrowing the Nasserist government and establishing a "pure" islamist state.

Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late Muhammad Atef had the same aims and was, if anything, more deadly and was responsible for the assasination of the late President Anwar es-Sadat in 1981. Ayman al-Zawahiri became Osama bin Laden's deputy in Al Qua'ida and is thought to be one of its top terror strategists and planners.

Ironically, it was the US and Egyptian governments which supported and encouraged the Afghanistan Connection.

After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA organised a program to support the Afghani Mujahiddin with arms and funds in cooperation with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Bin Laden, and called upon the Gulf states and Egypt to facilitate the travel of Arabs who wished to participate in the fighting.

Kamal Hassan Ali, then the Egyptian Minister of Defence at the time, announced the training of Afghani revolutionaries in Egyptian army camps. In 1980 the Egyptian Parliament issued an official invitation to Egyptian citizens to enlist in the Mujahiddin. Advertisements in the official papers invited young Egyptians to "join the caravan" traveling to Afghanistan. The Islamic seminary of Al Azhar which was and which remains a hotbed of islamist clerics also pitched in to recruit youth and send them over.

Many of those who went to Afghanistan went with the express purpose of gaining military expertise during their participation in battles there which would help them train their brothers and pass on their expertise. Starting in 1990, groups of them started returning to Egypt, some of them waiting for directives, others acting on their initiative.

The first Egyptian operation by Salafist terrorists after the Afghan - Soviet war was the assassination of Rifaat Al Mahgoub, the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, at the end of 1990 and there were many other attacks during the 1990s.

Hosni Mubarak's Egyptian government has waged a bitter campaign against Jamaat al-Islamiyya, Islamic Jihad, and other islamist groups. The government has largely succeeded in preventing many terrorist attacks in Egypt, but only at the price of egregious human rights abuses. It is thought that more than 20,000 islamists were detained without trial. Many were executed and many more were tortured.

The affluent whisky drinking, Mercedes driving bourgoisie of Egypt naturally condemn these groups and their terrorist activities, but the groups have massive support among the poor working classes of Egypt. The Cairo Times describes the islamists as "Egypt's only mass political movement".

Although the Egyptian government presently seems to be more or less in control of the internal situation, there are many militants from these movements outside Egypt as refugees - in England and Denmark and thousands of returned Afganis presently keeping a low profile.

Egyptians do not like to talk about it, but many Egyptian cafés in working class district burst into applause when the World Trade Center towers were destroyed.

Sudan, under President Omar el-Bashir, is a state which is under a Salafist government, the National Islamic Front, which aims to impose strict sharia law on all the Sudanese, including the 25% who are non Muslim. Sudan’s civil war, has lasted 47 years and pits the government against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, based in the non-Muslim, sub-Saharan south of the country. The war has led to the deaths of about 2 million people and displaced millions more. The country has been on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism since 1993. Sudan has given shelter to Salafist and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Al Qua'ida, which used Sudan as its main operational and training base from 1991 to 1996. It is also though to be involved with Abu Nidal, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Other Regional Groups

Apart from the Egyptian and Algerian groups, there are smaller groups of Salafist terrorists in most countries where there is a sizeable Muslim population, e.g. Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen and Jaish-e-Muhammad in Kashmir, Jund al- Islam, Hamas and Tawhid in Iraqi Kurdistan, Chechen groups and more shadowy cells in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and so on.

Finally there are the Salafist groups in and around Palestine--Abu Nidal (based in Iraq), Hamas and Islamic Jihad of which Hamas is the larger and has more poplar support. These groups were marginal until the Israeli repression in the occupied territories. They now have immense popular support. Hezbollah in Lebanon is also salafist, but it is a Shia group and is more linked to Iran than to the Al Qua'ida network. Ansar-al-Islam based in Kurdistan and Lebanon is now thought to be active in Iraq. All these overseas groups have connections with each other and to the Al Qua'ida - Jamaat al Islami - Taliban centres in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.

The quantity of information freely available on the world wide web has increased by many orders of magnitude in the last 20 years. But there can be no doubt from materials now available that academics, intelligence services and others with an interest in Muslim and Middle East affairs were very well aware of the existence of Salafist terrorist groups from about 1979.

by Rene Jarque

Introduction

The Oakwood Incident of 27 Jul 2003 revived the almost forgotten issues of unprofessionalism and corruption in the Armed Forces. The grievances expressed by the mutinous soldiers show that the AFP has not reformed 17 years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. In propaganda work, “a lie told a thousand times becomes the truth” and one of the biggest lie told by many a general is that the AFP has become professional. Another is that there is no corruption in the AFP. Sure, uniforms have changed and an AFP Theater and Generals’ Lounge have been built but meaningful changes that promote professionalism, uplift morale and welfare and use resources efficiently have not occurred. The Magdalo Group episode, removed of its political colors, I believe, is a manifestation of the continuing frustration of the soldiers with their officers and of the officers with the chain of command.

In this presentation, I will share my answers to four simple and basic questions about military reform, answers that may be far more complicated than the questions:

1) Is there a need for reform in the Armed Forces?

2) What should be the areas for reform?

3) Is reforming the military possible?

4) Who are responsible for military reform?

Is there a need for reform in the Armed Forces?

Yes, definitely there is. The signposts of unprofessionalism and corruption are everywhere -- the sergeant who sells combat boots and grenades, the major who gets a kickback from purchases, the lieutenant who accepts bribes from illegal loggers, the general who converts unit funds for personal purposes, the sergeant who hides his incompetence through a padrino, the colonel who seeks promotion by palakasan or sipsipan and every officer or enlisted personnel who receives an allowance derived from an illegal practice called “conversion”. Poor hospital conditions, shoddy maintenance of equipment, inadequate housing for soldiers, unflyable planes and unsailable vessels, no first aid kits to field units, lack of ammunition -- all these point to something fundamentally wrong with the state of the AFP today and the need for reform.

At present, the Armed Forces can be likened to a crumbling, old house that is tattered everywhere with its foundations weak and crumbling. No amount of repainting and re-plastering of the walls or repairing the creaking floor will make it stronger as the pillars and foundations are weak. It may look ornate and pretty on the outside but the paint merely hides the rot in the wooden panels. It may still be standing but termites are crawling everywhere eating away the beams and pillars. The parades and uniforms look good but discipline and professionalism is wanting. What is required is a total overhaul.

The gripes of the soldiers sat Oakwood brings into question how the Philippine defense establishment is being managed. The US-RP Joint Defense Assessment in 2001 points out that the Department of National Defense “lacks a systematic process for assessing its programs and policies and has no comprehensive long-range plan for the AFP. This inhibits the efficient use of defense resources and realistic planning for the future”. In an essay in Newsbreak, noted journalist Marites Vitug describes the AFP as “fat, old and weary” saying “name a problem, they’ve got it” including low readiness, skewed structure, aged workforce, lack of equipment. In other words, the AFP is a mess. Vitug concludes that the AFP is an organization that badly seeks leadership, one that I might add should be professional and upright. Former Captain Rex Robles, a member of the Feliciano Commission, writes of “deep-seated grievances in the Armed Forces: AFP camps being sold with no clear benefits to the military; a pension fund used as milking cow of a privileged few; an army without decent medical care; an air force without planes; a navy without ships and a ground force with antiquated communications equipment and lacking in ammunition. In short a military that is probably the most backward in the region.”

With so many reform initiatives initiated after the 1986 EDSA Revolution and in between many coup attempts, one would ask, isn’t the AFP reformed yet? Yes, piecemeal reforms have occurred and strides have been gained in civil-military relations, human rights, training and strategic thinking. However, in terms of the overall professionalism of the Officer Corps and in financial and logistics management, much needs to be done. Fundamental problems and the reasons behind them have not been addressed and no real, honest to goodness reform has happened. The AFP may have lost its omnipotence during martial law but many practices that made it an unprofessional and tainted organization during that period remain. In fact, many of the unethical practices have been institutionalized.

Perhaps, I am being naive, too idealistic and even, stupid (and I am not trying to be high and mighty about this as I too have been drawn into unprofessional and unethical conduct while an Officer) but to me, more than any other public servant, a soldier should practice the utmost professionalism, discipline and integrity. The officers have taken an oath to serve the country and people and the present state of the AFP fails to live up to that oath. It bothers me that the generals and senior officers are unable to act accordingly on their oath and build a credible and professional Armed Forces, despite knowing what is wrong. This indicates a serious lack of integrity and professionalism. And what hypocrisy to declare themselves as professional and honorable. If people only know the truth. Indeed, I feel saddened by the notion that the present state of the AFP does not bring honor and dignity to the thousands of soldiers who have died in service of the nation, that my friends and comrades have died needlessly, not to preserve freedom but rather to make the politicians and generals rich and happy. As Captain Maestrecampo, one of the leaders of the Oakwood Incident, rightfully asked “Saan ang kabuluhan ng pagkapatay ng mga sundalo?”

In my resignation letter to the Secretary of National Defense in 1998, I wrote candidly and perhaps, foolishly:

Sir…I want to leave because I feel that I am beginning to lose my self-esteem, my self-respect and my sense of integrity in an organization that I believe is unprofessional and corrupt. I have always believed that being an officer is a noble vocation – that officers follow the professional military ethic and treat each other professionally. But what I have seen are officers, especially many generals, who take advantage of the system for selfish and unethical purposes and undercut each other for promotions and assignments. I always thought that being an officer is a public trust – that an officer does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do. But what I have seen are officers, including Peemayers, who would not hesitate to lie to advance themselves or do anomalous business transactions, who cheat the taxpayers of their money and who even reward unethical conduct.”

What are the areas for reform?

I believe there are two general areas that a military reform campaign should address: unprofessionalism and corruption. Unprofessionalism refers to those practices that undermine the three elements of the military profession as explained by political thinker Samuel Huntington: expertise, responsibility, corporateness. In other words, those decisions and/or actions that weakens or destroys the manner with which the soldier can optimally perform his duty within a framework of integrity and camaraderie. Examples are poor leadership, tactical and technical incompetence, favoritism and nepotism, ticket-punching, inexperience or lack of combat experience, promotions and appointments not based on merit but on palaksasan and bata-bata, extracting personal services from soldiers and criminal activities such as the blackmarketing scandal in East Timor, human rights abuses or engaging in the drug trade or arms smuggling.

Another example of unprofessionalism is the misplaced priorities and follies of AFP leaders -- building an AFP Theater when the AFP Medical Center cannot provide decent health care, building a canopy over GHQ when the soldiers are living in dilapidated barracks and using the soldier’s hard-earned money in the RSBS to fund outlandish projects that merely enrich them and their retired comrades. It also includes military management issues such as the lack of a coherent military strategy, inefficient procurement and logistics system, lack of doctrine, etc. Stretching it further, unprofessionalism also includes attitudes in the Officer Corps today like “Wait till you become”, “Go with the flow”, “If you cannot beat them, join them”.

The other area for reform is corruption. Like any government agency, the AFP has its own share of the “normal” graft and corrupt practices such as commissions, kickbacks, overpricing, padding, substitution, rigged biddings, under-delivery and ghost delivery. This is common knowledge among suppliers, dealers, auditors, supply officers, enlisted personnel and everyone involved in the supply and finance chain. However, the AFP is involved in a far more sophisticated form of corruption that can be called the “mother” of all corruption in the AFP. This is the practice called “conversion”. It is the ultimate source of abuse and corruption in the AFP that has caused demoralization in the ranks. What is conversion and why is it a problem?

In an essay in the Army Journal in 1997, I defined conversion as “the process of converting procurements to its cash equivalent”. Col. Ricardo Morales, a fellow advocate for AFP reform, describes it in his essay in the same magazine in 2001: “if an amount is originally intended for office supplies but is instead spent for construction materials, this amount has to be ‘converted’ so that government accounting and auditing requirements are satisfied” (read: circumvented). In the process of conversion, either from one expense item to another or to outright cash, a certain percentage called the “cost of money” is skimmed off the top which goes to everyone in the signature chain involved in the fraud, from the requisitioners to suppliers and auditors. Rates of 25% or higher are normal but the dealer actually only gets somewhere between 9-16% as the rest goes to approving and auditing authorities in various offices. Obviously, there are benefits and downsides to the conversion process. An advantage is that it provides the flexibility to procure needed items that government accounting and auditing procedures does not allow. For example, an office can buy a much-needed computer by converting excess fund allocation for office supplies. In the field, a commander can use the converted cash for operations such spare parts for trucks, batteries for radios, medicines for civic projects, a goat for pulutan with village officials and food for visitors at headquarters.

On the other hand, there are six major downsides to conversion:

1) First, it is illegal as it violates the AFP Procurement System, Commission on Audit Circular 81-09 and Republic Act 3019: The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Conversion is “grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service”.

2) Second, it is subject to misuse and abuse in the hands of unscrupulous officers and soldiers. As on record, converted funds are “cleared”, commanding officers can use them for any purpose desired to include personal expenses, allowances, travel “pabaon”, retirement packages for retiring generals, buy a house and car, pay personal credit card bills, even night-clubbing and philandering purposes.

3) Third, since items bought through converted funds are evidences of an unethical act, they are not entered into the property book and can be taken away. I have heard of offices buying laptops every time a new boss comes in because they were taken by the previous occupants.

4) Fourth, conversion is essentially inefficient as the “cost of money” does not maximize the use of that resource. Projects than need conversion must always have the 25% on top of the projected expenditure. It also distorts the financial planning process as the budget does not reflect actual expenditures and these actual expenditures are not properly recorded.

5) The purchases and activities resulting from converted funds are foremost sources of corruption, income discrepancies, professional jealousies and demoralization in the Armed Forces. The lifestyle of officers and soldiers receiving allowances derived from conversion are far more affluent than those who rely on their salaries alone. The Captain who rides a jeepney and sees a fellow Captain, receiving the same salary, drive a nice car feels not only inadequacy but also resentment.

6) And the biggest downside of all is the adverse effect of conversion on the professional ethics of the officers and soldiers who have to resort to it to cover operational requirements and achieve the mission. It is a serious violation of the Officer Code that “An Officer does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do”, subverting the officer’s integrity. . It slowly and very subtly erodes the moral fibers of soldiers involved in it. It is an anathema to the ethical and professional development of an officer.

In many cases, a unit commander cannot be blamed for converting his funds. Operations dictate particular requirements but the budget allocated is in a different accounting class. Coupled with stringent government auditing rules and unscrupulous dealers, military officers and auditors, conversion becomes a necessary evil, essential to accomplishing the mission. Hence, it is both a solution and a problem. However, considering its downsides, it is more of a problem that must be resolved. Through conversion, corruption in the AFP is considered worse than the PNP. While the PNP is from outside means such as illegal logging, illegal gambling and extortion activities, the AFP sources from its own budget, eating away what ought to go to the soldiers, ie. combat boots converted to cash for personal use. Such is the evil of conversion and there must be a way to first control its use and then, to audit the monies and properties derived from it. Ultimately, it should be eliminated and replaced with a system that promotes transparency, probity and accountability.

Is Rebuilding the Armed Forces possible?

I have experienced attempting to reform the Armed Forces in both ways: the violent way with implications in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts and the peaceful way through the “Rizal” way of writing about and advocating military reforms. The failures of the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts are well known. For the peaceful way, I figured that if it cannot be done through the use of the sword, I can push reform through the power of the pen. So I wrote, wrote and wrote -- in magazines, letters to the editor, research papers, even letters to our lawmakers. When I was editor of the Army Journal, I tried to transform it to be a “forum for professional issues” and not just the sounding board or photo album for the generals. We started publishing essays critical of Army systems and for a while, got away with it. However, in 1998, I wrote an essay questioning the AFP Campaign Plan as unrealistic and denouncing “conversion” as unethical. The Commanding General, Philippine Army was not happy with it and had the magazine burned. He also relieved the Army spokesman who had it distributed and the editorial staff was bawled out by the CG,PA who called them “traitors” for publishing the essay. At another time, I exposed conversion in the media and I was relieved of my position by the Chief of Staff who instructed that I be reassigned to farthest outpost. He then had the gall to deny that there exists no conversion or technical malversation in the AFP, knowing full well that there is. He also told media that I had a skewed sense of professionalism. I called his admin officer and told him that not only is the Chief of Staff a thief, he is also a liar.

Thus, if my experience is any indication, the chain of command, all the way up to the Commander in Chief, does not listen very well to soundings of reform. No amount of coup attempts and mutinies, Davide Commissions, Congressional Hearings and millions of pages about military reform have made a real difference. In fact, many of the abhorrent practices in the AFP have become so entrenched that it will be difficult to untangle them. Yes, there is a grievance system in the Armed Forces, such as the Inspector General (IG), Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA) and Provost Marshall (PM) but it does not work as it ought to. Legitimate complaints and constructive criticisms are clamped down by the chain of command as insubordination, dissent or worse, rebellion.

Once in a while, you get crazy guys like Admiral Wong, Commander Angue, Captain Lim and LTSG Trillanes who will openly denounce corruption and unprofessionalism. The outcome? Some are relieved and/or transferred, some get co-opted back and promoted or given good positions, others are silenced with threats, others, like myself, resign. One thing is constant however -- the complaints are, on the whole, ignored and eventually forgotten. No genuine actions are taken and later, everything goes back to normal again. For now, we can only hope that the investigations being conducted by Congress and the Feliciano Commission are serious, sincere efforts and not merely “palabas” and eventually a useless exercise. For what has happened to the results of the Davide Commission? Where has the idealism of the officers involved in previous coup attempts gone? And what has happened to the Armed Forces of the Philippines? From past experience, there is cause for pessimism that the government will not take serious action and the AFP will not undertake comprehensive reform. There is too much at stake.

Over the years, official proclamations on reform have been mere lip service and unethical conduct has been openly tolerated and even encouraged. How many times have we heard a Chief of Staff or Commanding General proclaim that the AFP has become professional? But no senior officer has been caught or punished for financial wrongdoings and unqualified officers continue to be promoted. It has become a never-ending cycle of abuse and corruption to which there is seemingly no end, from one Chief of Staff to another, one Commander in Chief to the next. Nobody seems to be really listening. Look at what is happening now. Whether intentionally or not, the issue of corruption raised by the Magdalo group has been overshadowed by other issues. They call this in Psychological Operations, diversion. The reputation of the mutiny leaders is also being questioned. When the counter-propagandist cannot directly refute the issues, they demolish the source’s credibility. This is called indirect refutation. Sooner or later, the corruption issues raised by the Magdalos are likely to be forgotten. Indeed, anyone advocating reform in the AFP is a voice in the wilderness and the frustration of the Magdalo group when it comes to the AFP chain of command not listening is understandable, but not their action at Oakwood.

Military reform will not come easy and will come with great risks to the Arroyo administration or to any administration. It will be an uphill battle against former generals who will be offended when human rights abuses and corrupt financial transactions are exposed. There will be resistance from those whose careers and economic interests will be threatened -- unscrupulous defense officials, senior officers, politicians and influential suppliers. It will be difficult because the very generals and colonels now running the system benefited or are benefiting from it. How can one reform a corrupt system that is protected by the generals from all sides, those still in the service, those in government service and those who are already retired. Plus you have the connections with politicians and big businessmen. By admitting that the system is defective puts into question their own rise in the ranks and their positions. As for conversion, why kill the goose that lays the golden egg?

Indeed, it will be difficult but not hopeless. I am not entirely pessimistic and I believe that with political will, moral courage and the right management, rebuilding the professionalism and integrity of the Armed Forces is possible. As many say, it cannot be done overnight but we must start sometime, somehow. Indeed, the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Many say that unprofessionalism and corruption is an ethical or moral problem. Yes, morality is an issue but that will take time to change. To effect quick changes, they should be looked at as management problems that can be controlled and managed. Where bad leadership and management voids are glaring, unprofessionalism and corruption follows. Military reform should be approached as if it was a change management project with clear objectives, systematic processes and well-structured, motivated teams with good leaders. Performance, transparency and accountability shall be the name of the game. We are not asking the AFP to be perfect as every organization has its share of incompetence, sycophancy, intriguers and politics. We are merely asking to make professional and ethical conduct to be the norm rather than the exception.

Yes, I am pessimistic but still hopeful. If not, God save our Armed Forces and our country. Turning-around the AFP can be done. What is lacking in AFP reform is the political resolve and the moral courage to face the risks and take action. I have been involved in change programs and yes, it will not be easy and will come with a lot of sacrifice on the part of the leaders. Top management commitment, support and example are very important ingredients, things that have been absent in military reform actions in the past and until now. There is also no real motivation to be committed to change or reform as fixing conversion, for example, is a threat to personal economic interests. The lack of competence among officers to drive changes is another factor. But there are well-meaning, competent and quick-learning young officers who can lead a reform campaign without a mutiny. The challenge is how to nurture these men so that they will maintain their professionalism and integrity as they rise in rank, that their idealism will not turn to apathy and cynicism as material temptations and military politics begin to affect them.

One other thing that needs to be corrected if reform is to be an acceptable idea to the AFP Command is the concept of “criticism”. The general mindset today is that anything which points out the wrongdoing of senior officers is considered as “insubordination”. Orders in combat are one thing but telling a commander that he is not supposed to use unit funds for personal use is another. It is a sign of professionalism not insubordination. In my case, I was branded a “rightist rebel” in my early days as a lieutenant when I got involved in the 1989 coup attempt. Then, when my father, General Jarque, defected to the NDF in 1993, I was branded a “left-leaning” rebel. The funny thing is that I was advocating the same issues of unprofessionalism and corruption in the AFP which know no boundaries of ideology, right, left or center. For me, it was just the right thing that a professional officer ought to do. It did not occur to my superiors that I was just trying to be a progressive officer and a professional soldier.

Who are Responsible for AFP Reform?

There is a saying in the military, “The Commander is responsible for everything that the unit does or fails to do”. As the commanders come from the Officer Corps, I say that the present state of unprofessionalism and corruption in the military is a failure in leadership of the Officer Corps. Clearly, the fault and the responsibility lies in the officers and their collective failure to build a truly professional military. It is in the Officer Corps where both the problem and the solution lies. Directives and laws will not solve unprofessionalism and corruption. A dedicated pool of leaders and managers is needed not only to implement the directives and policies but also to set the example. Certainly, the future of the Armed Forces, whether it improves or regresses, is in the hands of the Officer Corps. The great Chinese reformer, Wang Ah Shih (1021-86 AD) said that there are two requirements in the fight against reform: first are rational and efficient laws and second, powerholders of high moral caliber. These morally upright leaders should not only ensure compliance to the laws, they should serve as shining examples as well as communicate the intrinsic worth, the reason and the benefits of professional and ethical conduct.

I resigned from the military service was because I felt that the professional milieu in the AFP was no longer acceptable to my sense of integrity. Looking back, there was nothing faulty with the AFP as an organization. The fault-line lay deeper--in its leaders. The ultimate reason for the AFP’s failure as an institution to uphold the virtues of the profession of arms lies in the Officer Corps. The unprofessionalism and corruption in the AFP today are merely reflective of the professional and moral bankruptcy of the Officer Corps. Instead of a life of “genteel poverty” and “noblesse oblige”, many officers live with “flaunted riches” and “ignoble intents”. Ill-gotten wealth converted into palatial houses, expensive cars and fancy jewelry have become symbols of status and respectability. The simplicity of life that should be espoused by a professional soldier has turned to materialism, status craving, greed and apathy to values.

At the core of reform is the integrity of the officers -- from the Lieutenant to the General, from the platoon leader to the Chief of Staff. The Martial Law years disoriented the values of the Officer Corps and many of that era’s attitude and practices remain today. What has happened to the colonels and generals who were once the same lieutenants and captains possessed with idealism and energy? Over the years, as a result of government neglect and public apathy, officers have been accustomed to unethical practices as a way of getting around a rigid system in order to provide for legitimate operational requirements. In the hands of unscrupulous officers, these practices are abused for personal gain and power.

What is intriguing is that the AFP senior staff are mostly Peemayers and in large measure, Peemayers must share the blame and the responsibility for the dismal state of the Armed Forces (and also the Philippine National Police). The despicable state of the Officer Corps today is, for the most part, the result of action and/or inaction of Peemayers who have failed to live up to the Academy motto of Courage, Integrity, Loyalty, who have chosen the easier wrong to the harder right. The “mistah” system has seemingly become a code of omerta and a protection racket. PMA has been successful in churning out officers for a progressive and lucrative military career but it has utterly failed in imbuing cadets and officers with character, moral courage and integrity. And the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Association has been conspicuously silent about the actions of its members. Another organization that has been quiet is the Association of General and Flag Officers whose members, were once the top AFP leaders.

Necessarily, due to the hierarchical structure of the AFP, a peaceful and relatively quicker reform campaign must start from the top. The approach must be top-down. Inputs from the bottom must, however, be generated and buy-in created to ensure an effective reform process. But today, given the overall character and quality of the Officer Corps and the top chain of command, I have serious doubts whether the Armed Forces of the Philippines can police its own self and reform from within. Reforming the AFP will be difficult but it is not hopeless for so long as there are officers who try to live up to the ideals and indeed, there are officers who try to be professional and honest. As the Marines say, “we need a few good men”. Unfortunately, it is these few good men who do not rise for they are too honest for their own good. The hope for reform lies in the junior officers of today who unfortunately are slowly being corrupted and eaten up by the present corrupt system. How to shield these junior officers from the rotten acts of their superiors and promote professional ethics in their ranks as they rise in their military career is going to be a serious challenge. But it is a must if we are to build a professional and honest Officer Corps which means a professional and honest Armed Forces.

Towards this end, I believe that the civil sector should play a role in reforming the military by way of pressure, by keeping the reform process alive, by opening up issues and concerns to the public in order to create a “Community of Conscience” strengthened by a moral bond that will constantly remind the AFP of the need for reform. This community can create public opinion and a sense of shame that censures and condemns corrupt officers. The role of Congress is essential as reforming the AFP will require the enactment of laws or the review of existing laws governing the military and defense. Perhaps, Congressional inquiries “in aid of legislation” can be more forthright and sincere in opening up and publicly discussing sensitive professional and ethical matters such as conversion and political intervention in promotions and assignments. They should continue the pressure for prosecution of generals involved in the RSBS scandal for which even the retirement funds of the soldiers were not exempted from their crookedness. Lifestyle checks should focus on senior officers as not all of them can have heiresses as wives.

However, more than the Legislative, it is the Executive branch that should lead the reform process. The Department of Finance and/or Budget and Management should investigate the matter of conversion--as it is very difficult to find witnesses and evidences without the cooperation of the AFP--and devise ways to minimize, if not to eliminate, graft and corrupt practices in the AFP. The President is the Commander in Chief and therefore holds ultimate command responsibility for the AFP. The President’s decisions and actions will dictate the intensity and tempo of reform. In the end, the failure to reform the AFP is the failure of the Commander in Chief. Hence, the biggest question of all is whether the Commander in Chief, the President, has the moral courage and the political will to initiate fundamental reforms.

On the Oakwood “Magdalo” Incident

I recall my experiences in 1987 and 1989 and I cannot help but see myself in the soldiers at Oakwood. Whether they were used or manipulated is the subject of an investigation and I will not dwell into that. What I would like to say though it that in the young officers mind, I surmise a desire to do good – a sense of combined idealism, frustration and adventurism. A major factor in the creation of this mindset is the politicization of the soldiers in the field where they are exposed to the inadequacies of the government and the Armed Forces. In trying to accomplish their mission of “wining the hearts and minds” of the people in remote barangays, soldiers become involved in the life of the community. In many cases, they take over government responsibilities where they are lacking in the form of medical and dental civacs, education programs and other organizing and development projects.

Then after experiencing the hardships in their detachments, they visit Camp Aguinaldo or Fort Bonifacio and they see a glaring inequity in lifestyle. While they are “rotting” in the field, their senior officers are “enjoying” in the camps. While they find it difficult to source funds to fix their jeeps and trucks in the mountains, majors and colonels drive around in nice cars in Metro Manila. While they receive a meager salary, they find that their comrades and mistahs are getting unauthorized allowances double or triple their basic salaries. Frustration sets in and the barrel of the gun, and the inherent sense of power that comes with it, becomes a way to release that frustration. That frustration and idealism can be manipulated by scrupulous people who will use it for their own ends. It is indeed sad to see such promising officers go to waste. As a former officer, I agree to the nobility of their cause but not the means.

Yes, the means the young officers employed is disagreeable but the cause that they espoused in denouncing corruption in the Armed Forces is very much alive. I had the same questions when I was a junior officer: to whom can we go to if the chain of command is not listening? Perhaps, in the minds of the Magdalos, bringing their cause to the Filipino people was the best thing to do and perhaps, even the most honorable as indeed, they are soldiers of the Filipino people and not of the generals and politicians.

Conclusion

Having been an officer, I continue to feel responsible for the dismal state of the AFP today. Thus, I continue to advocate for military reform as I cannot accept the current state of the AFP despite the rosy rhetoric from the generals about a “reformed” AFP. The cries and gripes of the Magdalo group say otherwise. And there are thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen who are mute witnesses to the unprofessionalism and corruption in the AFP that continues to fuel discontent and frustration. The threat of a coup or a mutiny can only be neutralized if we reform the AFP for it to be a responsible and honest organization led by a professional Officer Corps.

No amount of lessons in democracy nor instilling the concept of civilian authority over the military can prevent another military mutiny or coup attempt in the future. Only by reforming the Armed Forces and creating a professional and honest Officer Corps can we be assured that the military will know its rightful place in a democratic society. Moreover, our national defense and security will never be effectively unless the AFP becomes a professional and honorable force. For the sake of the country and our people, for our children and posterity, the Armed Forces of the Philippines must be reformed.

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Author’s Profile

Rene N. Jarque is a former Philippine Army officer who served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of National Defense and published the first National Defense Policy Paper (In Defense of the Philippines, 1998). He was Chief of Strategic Research of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines wherein he published several papers on security concerns and defense-military management and represented the AFP in international security conferences. Scout Ranger, Airborne and PSYOPS qualified, he served in a variety of command and staff positions in the First Scout Ranger Regiment, 5^th Infantry Division and the Psychological Operations Group. He authored the manual on Psychological Operations and co-authored a Scout Ranger manual. He was a lecturer in AFP schools with the distinction of Best Instructor Award and was editor of the Army Journal, Cavalier and the OSS Digest. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, class of 1986, and has an MBA from the Ateneo Graduate School of Business. He is presently working as an executive abroad.

(taken from a forwarded mail from an Ateneo alumni egroup)